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The role of the courts in mitigating election violence in Nigeria
Violence occurs in a slight majority of elections held in sub-Saharan Africa. Several 
recent studies have examined the effectiveness of various interventions on the prevalence 
of violent elections; however, the role of the courts has been relatively less studied. Using 
data on electoral violence during the 2015 and 2019 Nigerian elections, we examine un-
der what conditions courts can moderate election-related violence. We find that success-
fully challenging an election outcome in the courts is related to a reduction in the lethality 
of violence in the next election, but only if the courts are generally perceived as trustwor-
thy. These findings indicate that in addition to building judicial capability, improving 
generalized trust in judicial institutions is key to reducing electoral violence. 
Keywords: elections, electoral violence, judiciary, dispute resolution, 
institutional trust, Nigeria
O papel dos tribunais na redução da violência eleitoral na Nigéria
A violência ocorre numa ligeira maioria das eleições realizadas na África subsariana. 
Vários estudos recentes têm analisado a eficácia de diversas intervenções sobre a prevalên-
cia de eleições violentas; no entanto, o papel dos tribunais tem sido relativamente menos 
estudado. Utilizando dados sobre a violência eleitoral durante as eleições nigerianas de 
2015 e 2019, examinamos em que condições os tribunais podem moderar a violência asso-
ciada às eleições. Observamos que contestar com sucesso um resultado eleitoral nos tribu-
nais está relacionado com uma redução da letalidade da violência nas eleições seguintes, 
mas só se os tribunais forem comummente percebidos como confiáveis. Estes resultados 
indicam que além de reforçar a capacidade judicial, melhorar a confiança generalizada nas 
instituições judiciais é fundamental para reduzir a violência eleitoral.
Palavras-chave: eleições, violência eleitoral, poder judicial, resolução de 
disputas, confiança institucional, Nigéria
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African countries reintroduced1 multiparty politics in the early 1990s as the 
curtains came down on the Cold War era. By 1997, 75% of countries in sub-Saha-
ran Africa had adopted multiparty elections, with the exception of Eritrea, which 
has not conducted presidential or national assembly elections since its independ-
ence referendum in 19932. Many sub-Saharan African countries have made sig-
nificant strides towards democratic development, but election-related violence 
has also increasingly become a common feature of the politics of alternation of 
power in Africa. Thus, while elections in sub-Saharan Africa have become ubiq-
uitous, challenges around election management, particularly related to electoral 
violence, still remain. 
On average, a majority of elections conducted in sub-Saharan Africa result 
in violence. Conservative3 estimates from the Social Conflict in Africa Dataset 
(SCAD) (Salehyan et al., 2012) indicate that sub-Saharan African countries con-
ducted 390 elections from1990 to 2012 in which 57 percent of the elections expe-
rienced some form of electoral violence. Of the 390 elections, 132 elections expe-
rienced pre-election violence while 91 elections also experienced post-election 
violence. Consistent with the SCAD dataset, Straus and Taylor’s (2012) African 
Electoral Violence Database (AEVD) also indicate that at least 60 percent of African 
elections experience electoral violence from 1990 to 2008. Burchard’s (2015) work 
concludes that at least 55 percent of elections conducted in Africa experienced 
some form of electoral violence and suggests that whereas post-election violence 
is less common, it tends to be more intense. 
Electoral violence has been associated with various negative consequences 
ranging from instability to the increased likelihood of civil war (Bekoe, 2012). For 
instance, electoral violence experienced in Ethiopia 2005, Nigeria 2007, Kenya 
2007, Zimbabwe 2008 and Ivory Coast in 2011 was deemed violent enough to 
destabilize each of these countries4. Similarly, electoral violence has been linked 
to effects on voter turnout (Bekoe & Burchard, 2017; Collier & Vicente, 2012) 
and the quality of democracy as assessed by potential voters (Burchard, 2015). 
Burchard further suggests that voters are less likely to express satisfaction with 
1  After the end of colonialism, most African countries emerged with at least two political parties, many 
informed by either a Western or Soviet Union ideology. Countries such as Botswana, Kenya, Senegal, Tanzania, 
and Zambia, for example, all held multiparty elections in the 1960s. These countries, however, reverted to a one-
party system shortly thereafter as many founding fathers sacrificed democracy for political stability, which they 
deemed favorable for managing such diverse social groups. See Englebert and Dunn (2013).
2  For more on elections in Eritrea, see http://africanelections.tripod.com/er.html
3  Demarest and Langer look at conflict patterns in Nigeria as recorded by Social Conflict in Africa Dataset 
(SCAD), Armed Conflict Locations and Events Dataset (ACLED) and a dataset developed by the authors using 
Nigerian sources and suggest that ACLED tends to under-report conflict events because it relies on international 
sources which are more likely to only report high profile events. See Demarest and Langer (2018). 
4  For more, see Bekoe (2012). 
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and support democracy or have trust in governing institutions if they are rou-
tinely subjected to electoral violence. Therefore, lessening election violence might 
help improve voter satisfaction, trust in governing institutions and overall shore 
up support for democracy. Such sentiments also find support in works such as 
Diamond (1997), which lend credence to the role of institutions in improving the 
quality and consolidation of democracy5. 
What we know so far in the burgeoning literature on electoral violence are 
potential reasons for some countries provide fertile grounds for election violence 
both at the national or macro-level (Fjelde & Höglund, 2016; Hafner-Burton et 
al., 2014; Norris et al., 2015; Salehyan & Linebarger, 2015) and subnational or 
micro-level (de Smedt, 2009; Höglund & Piyarathne, 2009; Klaus & Mitchell, 2015 
and Söderberg Kovacs & Bjarnesen, 2018). Yet, less examined, is the role of insti-
tutions in exacerbating or reducing electoral violence.
Recent research efforts, motivated to identify effective interventions to miti-
gate electoral violence, have focused on exploring strategies that can be employed 
to alleviate electoral violence; however, the role of courts as an intervention strat-
egy remains under-researched. To this end, we conduct an empirical analysis 
on the effect of election petition tribunals (EPTs) on the likelihood of election 
violence taking place in contemporary Nigerian elections. EPTs are temporary 
courts specifically established by the Nigerian government to resolve disputes 
after an election has occurred. Nigerian elections have been particularly violent 
since the country’s return to civilian governance in 1999. In relation to the rest of 
Africa, elections in Nigeria tend to be more violent than the average case, with 
significant numbers of physical injuries and fatalities. Fatalities have occurred 
before and after elections in 1999, 2003, 2007, 2011, 2015, and 2019. 
Elections by their very nature are contentious and it seems reasonable to 
assume that a dedicated mechanism put in place to adjudicate election-related 
grievances and suspected violations could reduce incentives to engage in elector-
al violence. If electoral actors believe that irregularities can be fairly challenged 
in an impartial venue, they may be less likely to resort to violence to win. In sit-
uations where electoral actors believe that there are no viable venues to resolve 
problematic elections, political actors may be more likely to turn to intimidation, 
harassment, and physical attacks to win elections. Furthermore, if political actors 
believe that an independent court system will hold them accountable for elector-
al infractions, they may be less likely to engage in fraud and violence. If no such 
judicial avenue exists, the inverse may be true. 
5  See Lindberg (2006) field work in Ghana which suggests that the quality of democracy improves as countries 
engage in regular elections. 
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In this paper, we test the efficacy of the judiciary in mitigating electoral vio-
lence with the caveat that for the courts to have a suppressive effect on electoral 
violence, political actors must have trust in the system. We argue that if those ag-
grieved during the electoral process, specifically political elites, lack trust in the 
dispute resolution mechanism, the expected utility of the courts as an alternative 
to violence for resolving election disputes will remain low. We argue that, par-
ticularly in Nigeria, the courts can provide an alternative to violence in disputed 
elections and reduce the prevalence of electoral violence, but only if the courts 
are perceived as trustworthy. The paper proceeds as follows. We start with an 
overview of electoral violence in sub-Saharan Africa. We follow with the theoret-
ical argument on why courts can reduce electoral violence. We then conduct an 
empirical test on the effects of the courts on electoral violence in Nigeria’s 2015 
and 2019 elections. We analyze and discuss the findings in the section thereafter 
then conclude with how and why courts matter in reducing electoral violence 
and consolidating democracy.
Overview of electoral violence in sub-Saharan Africa 
Electoral violence is not a new phenomenon nor is it idiosyncratic to Africa. 
Countries in the early throes of democratic transition often face election-related 
violence as citizens seek to exercise their freedoms within an extended franchise. 
Seymour and Frary (1918) present an early example of violent electoral tactics in 
the 20th century positing that Magyars in Hungary engaged in non-Magyar voter 
suppression by destroying bridges and quarantining horses in the outlying vil-
lages that would be used to get the non-Magyars to polling stations.
More recent research has argued for disaggregating electoral violence based 
on timing, strategy and actors to better understand the motivation behind vi-
olence. On the timing of electoral violence, scholars have argued that election 
violence essentially falls into three phases with each phase ideally driven by dif-
ferent theoretical motivations and causal processes. Both Höglund (2009) and 
Daxecker (2014) suggest that the motivation behind pre-election and election day 
violence is to affect the outcome of the elections or disenfranchise voters that 
would otherwise help tip the election in favor of an opponent. On the other hand, 
post-election violence is employed as a response to the outcome of an election 
deemed fraudulent or in order to force the hand of other actors like courts or 
election commissions to recount the ballots or cancel the results and call fresh 
elections. Essentially, whereas pre-election and election day violence is theoret-
ically intended to increase the chances of winning for the violence entrepreneur 
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by suppressing voter turnout for the opposing party election, post-election vio-
lence happens as a reaction to a contested election outcome. 
To this end, although the timing of elections can be categorized into three dis-
tinct phases of pre-electoral, election day and post- electoral violence, the motiva-
tions for electoral violence map onto two broad categories of pre-6 and post-elec-
tion7 violence. As we have suggested above, the motivations for pre-electoral 
violence are to primarily influence the outcome of the election whereas post-elec-
toral violence is a reaction to the election outcome. Subsequently, we conceptual-
ize electoral violence into two phases of pre-electoral violence and post-electoral 
violence. Due to the messiness of separating election violence that happens six 
months before election day and violence that happens on election day, we stay 
consistent with other researchers (Burchard, 2015; Straus & Taylor, 2012) who 
conceptualize pre-electoral violence as combining both phases since both phases 
have similar theoretical motivations for violence. Similarly, electoral violence can 
be strategically employed to suppress voter turnout or mobilize supporters, or it 
can occur incidentally due to heightened competition between different political 
camps (Bekoe & Burchard, 2017). At the same time, both state actors and opposi-
tion groups can engage in electoral violence strategically to influence the turnout 
and outcome of elections, although state actors are much more likely to engage 
in electoral violence. Taylor et al. (2017) estimate that upwards of 80 percent of 
electoral violence is perpetrated by the state. 
Prevention of electoral violence 
The general understanding that electoral violence can lead to prolonged con-
flict (Bekoe, 2012), lower satisfaction with and support for democracy (Burchard, 
2015), and democratic stagnation (Bogaards, 2013) due to poor quality elections 
has led to a budding research whose efforts are directed at exploring election 
violence prevention. These efforts are informed by the theoretical argument that 
political exclusion is the main driver for electoral violence and political inclusivi-
ty might lower the likelihood of electoral violence. To this end, electoral violence 
prevention strategies have been based around interventions such as capacity 
building (Birch & Muchlinski, 2018; Claes & von Borzyskowski, 2018; Darnolf 
& Cyllah, 2014), attitude transformation (Birch & Muchlinski, 2018; Finkel, 2014; 
Fischer, 2017; Höglund & Jarstad, 2011), security planning (Claes, 2016; Claes & 
6  Conceptualized as violence related specifically to elections, starting six months before elections to include 
election day.
7  We conceptualize and measure post-election violent events as election related violent events that happen right 
after polling stations close to three months after polling.
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von Borzyskowski, 2018), and election monitoring (Asunka et al., 2019; Claes, 
2016; Claes & von Borzyskowski, 2018). 
Proponents of capacity building suggest that building technical skills in enti-
ties entrusted with conducting elections, for instance, election management bod-
ies, to help conduct credible elections can reduce electoral violence by increasing 
institutional trust, the quality of elections, ensure the acceptability of the election 
outcome for involved parties and, subsequently, legitimates the winner. Attitude 
transformation interventions are also deemed to reduce electoral violence by tar-
geting grievances that would otherwise foment and lead to electoral violence. 
These interventions can include educating voters, peace messaging, mediation, 
engaging the youth, roundtable discussions, peace pledging, and codes of con-
duct. Similarly, as Claes and von Borzyskowski (2018) find, security engagement 
by way of the police having a closer working relationship with local communi-
ties is associated with lower levels of electoral violence as evidenced by Kenya 
and Liberian elections. The evidence regarding the impact of election monitoring 
interventions, on the other hand, is very mixed. While some have found that the 
presence of election observers can decrease the likelihood of electoral violence 
from breaking out under certain circumstances (see Smidt, 2016), recent research 
suggests that election observation can exacerbate electoral violence instead of 
mitigating it by incentivizing political actors to strategically shift violence to the 
pre-election period not observed by election monitors (see Daxecker, 2014; Luo & 
Rozenas, 2018; von Borzyskowski, 2019).
Although the above research on interventions to mitigate electoral violence is 
instrumental and groundbreaking, it tends to focus on programmatic efforts that 
can be undertaken in the pre-election period to avoid electoral violence during or 
after elections. Subsequently, the gap we find in the literature so far is the lack of 
scholarly work on the role of domestic courts as key intervention actors by virtue 
of their dispute resolution role. Therefore, we are examining what exactly is the 
role of courts in mitigating electoral violence. 
Ideally, the courts would alleviate electoral violence by providing a dispute 
resolution mechanism through which aggrieved political contenders can seek re-
dress. In other words, whereas interventions around capacity building, attitude 
transformation, and security planning can pacify the eruption of electoral vio-
lence, they lack a dispute resolution component that political actors can revert to 
if they perceive that they have lost an election unfairly. It is against this backdrop 
that countries like Nigeria have tried to address election-related disputes by cre-
ating election petition tribunals (EPTs) at the federal and state level for legislative 
and gubernatorial election petitions that deal specifically with cases stemming 
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from electoral fraud, irregularities, and other illegalities. Established by the 1999 
Constitution, and amended in 2010, the specific statute tasks tribunals with de-
termining whether an individual has been validly elected (Library of Congress, 
2011). Consequently, we are interested in understanding if an impartial and in-
dependent court, as measured by trust in judiciary and EPT ruling, has any effect 
on electoral violence. Because in Nigeria there is variation in both the occurrence 
of electoral violence and public trust in the courts across the country’s 36 states, 
Nigeria is an ideal candidate to examine how judicial processes could impact the 
frequency and/or intensity of electoral violence.
Theory: judicial systems and electoral violence 
The constitutional function of courts as arbiters of domestic disputes predis-
poses them to being viewed as one of the first institutions political actors might 
seek intervention from during the electoral period. Ideally, the courts would pro-
vide an alternative for resolving election disputes because political actors would 
seek redress from the courts instead of resorting to violence. Additionally, a ro-
bust court system may act as a deterrent for violence if political actors believe 
they will be punished for the use of violence during an election campaign, but no 
research at this point exists to help us understand the effect of courts on electoral 
violence. 
What we know so far is that judicial independence in Africa varies widely 
and different countries have taken different pathways to achieve judicial inde-
pendence. Works such as Widner (2001), VonDoepp (2006), VonDoepp and Ellet 
(2011), Ellet (2013), and Prempeh (2017), although unrelated to the effectiveness 
of judiciaries in reducing electoral violence, have spoken to the evolution of the 
independence in African judiciaries. While Widner (2001) attributes the rise of 
judicial independence since the end of colonialism to the role of judges within 
the judiciary fighting for the independence of courts, Prempeh (2017) offers cau-
tious optimism that the judicial constitutional revival in Africa has been curtailed 
by imperial presidencies that are too strong to be checked by weak legislatures. 
VonDoepp (2006) and VonDoepp and Ellet (2011) examine factors that might 
affect judicial assertiveness suggesting that the security of tenure by the incum-
bent, extent of power concentration in one actor, and the level of interest in a 
given case by political actors will determine whether judges will choose to be 
assertive or exercise strategic self-restraint. In analysis of Uganda, Tanzania and 
Malawi, Ellet (2013) finds that judicial independence was higher in countries that 
had a robust civil society, a strong independent media, and a strong law society.
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We also know that, at least for Latin American countries, effectively function-
ing judiciaries are important for maintaining democratic gains. Larkins (1996) 
opines that an institutionalized judiciary is integral to democratic consolidation 
because it is the one institution tasked with enforcing the rule of law both on 
citizens and governments from exceeding their reach. To this end, various re-
searchers are in agreement (Chavez, 2004; Diamond, 1997; Larkins, 1996; Utter 
& Lundsgaard, 1993) that strong judiciaries play a critical role in consolidating 
democracy; however, the effectiveness of judiciaries in Africa still remains un-
der-researched.
To this end, research conducted by Abul-Ethem (2002) and Widner (2001), for 
example, point to the shortcomings of African judiciaries to safeguard the rule of 
law, while Kaaba (2015) suggest that African judiciaries have been complicit in 
the failure to help consolidate democracy in Africa. For instance, Widner (2001) 
suggests that competing centers of power and the weight of colonial legacies ef-
fectively delegitimized the African judicial systems by understaffing them while 
expecting them to blend customary and common law. Handicapped as such, 
African judiciaries perennially suffered from a lack of legitimacy by overpromis-
ing but failing to deliver justice. The lack of legitimacy by African judiciaries can 
be seen by the perennially low trust in judiciaries among African citizens. Based 
on survey data from 2014 and 2015, only a slight majority of respondents across 
36 African countries stated that they had confidence in the courts, and around 
one-third stated that “most” or “all” judges are corrupt (Logan, 2017). The lack of 
trust in the judiciary is compounded by African court’s proclivity for consistently 
ruling in favor of the incumbent in presidential election petitions (Kaaba, 2015), 
with the rare exception being Kenya in 2017. 
As poignant as these works are, they fail to interrogate the extent to which ju-
diciaries have been effective in reducing violence or forestalling instability. This 
is partly due to the lack of data on judicial decisions and the long processes the 
courts take before making pronouncements on cases. For instance, Simati’s (2018) 
dissertation work finds that it took an average of two years for the courts to pro-
nounce themselves on election petitions filed against President Moi’s election 
victories in 1992 and 1997. There is also a consensus that institutions responsible 
for dispute resolution in unconsolidated democracies have become increasing-
ly important. Widner (2001) posits that when courts adjudicate election-related 
disputes, they forestall the potential for violence and instability between contest-
ants and negate the attraction of these groups from resorting to pressing their 
grievances through their social groups. Ostensibly, during elections, those that 
feel aggrieved by the electoral process but have less trust in the judiciary are 
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more likely to resort to other means of dispute resolution, for instance violence. 
Essentially, by providing an avenue through which electoral disputes can be ad-
dressed, courts would ideally reduce the utility of reverting to electoral violence 
during elections by political actors. 
Nevertheless, the mere presence of courts will not incentivize political ac-
tors to choose courts to resolve their election disputes instead of using violence. 
Political actors are more likely to take their election-related grievances to court 
if they have trust that the court will be impartial. For instance, while looking at 
the behavior of the Ugandan courts regarding presidential and parliamentary 
election petitions, Murison (2013) finds that whereas the Ugandan High Court 
upheld election petitions and nullified various parliamentary elections, the Court 
of Appeal overturned most of the high court decisions. Similarly, although the 
Uganda Supreme Court acknowledged irregularities in the presidential elections 
won by Museveni in 2001 and 2006, it was unwilling to rule in favor of the oppo-
sition candidate and nullify the presidential elections. Under such circumstances, 
the opposition is less likely to lodge their complaints with the courts due to per-
ceived lack of impartiality and trust. Consequently, they are more likely to resort 
to electoral violence.
Similar research looking at the effect of courts on electoral violence from a 
dissertation by Simati (2018) conducted cross nationally on African countries be-
tween 1990-2012 finds that variation in judicial independence can influence both 
state actors and the opposition’s choice to employ post-election violence. The 
author finds that both the incumbent and the opposition are less likely to employ 
post-election violence in African countries that have independent or dependent 
judiciaries. Under independent judiciaries, both actors are more likely to bring 
their election related grievance to court due to trust in the impartiality of the court 
system. Similarly, under dependent judiciaries controlled by the incumbent, the 
opposition is less likely to strategically employ electoral violence to influence the 
judges because the judges are less likely to strategically defect and rule in favor 
of the opposition. The author argues that post-election violence is particularly 
prevalent under semi-independent judiciaries precisely because opposition can-
didates can strategically use electoral violence to create levels of political uncer-
tainty in order to influence judges to strategically defect or be assertive. Strategic 
use of violence is especially useful for the opposition if they deem the incumbent 
weak either due to a minority in the legislature8 or a small win margin.
Since courts can mitigate both pre-election and post-election violence by pro-
viding an alternative to election violence, we theorize that a trusted dispute res-
8  For presidential elections.
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olution mechanism can alleviate electoral violence. However, in the absence of 
a trusted court system, political actors are more likely to revert to electoral vio-
lence either to influence the outcome of an election or in reaction to a concluded 
election. We therefore argue that increased trust in courts will be correlated with 
lower levels of electoral violence while low trust in courts will be associated with 
higher levels of electoral violence. Similarly, we argue that successful nullifica-
tion of election results by the EPTs will have a constraining effect on electoral 
violence. Due to data limitations, we only conduct our analysis on pre-election 
violence9, not post-election violence.
Data and variables 
We seek to test this theory of court effects on electoral violence on the pre-elec-
tion period in Nigeria during the 2015 and 2019 elections based on the inde-
pendent variable operationalized as the EPT decisions from the 2011 and 2015 
elections, respectively. We conduct this analysis on Nigeria because the country’s 
history with the systematic violence that routinely breaks out during elections 
makes it a good candidate for this type of empirical analysis. More importantly, 
Nigeria is the only African country with specific EPTs set up precisely to deal 
with election petitions and pre- and post-electoral disputes. A similar court exists 
in South Africa, but as a standing body that is not reconstituted every election 
period. Other African countries adjudicate electoral related disputes within the 
existing judicial framework, which takes longer for the petitions to be resolved. 
We also examine changes over time in Nigeria as we believe that experience with 
the courts in one election can impact behavior in subsequent elections. 
After independence in 1960, Nigeria was largely ruled by successive military 
governments, with brief interruptions for episodic civilian rule. In 1999, Nigeria 
transitioned to a civilian-led government and conducted its first multiparty elec-
tions of its Fourth Republic. Violence has been a common feature of every elec-
tion since 1999, although the intensity, timing and type of violence have varied 
across different elections. For instance, Nigeria experienced significant levels of 
pre-electoral violence with an estimated 300 fatalities and 100 fatalities before the 
2007 and 2015 elections respectively (Bekoe, 2012). However, the 2011 elections 
9  At the time of writing this paper, data on pre-election violence for the 2019 elections was available but the data 
on post-election violence and EPT rulings for 2019 election petitions was not available yet. Subsequently, we are 
able to test the effect of the 2011 and 2015 EPT rulings on the 2015 and 2019 pre-election violence respectively. In 
other words, how did the 2011 EPT rulings affect the 2015 pre-election violence? Similarly, how did the 2015 EPT 
rulings affect the 2019 pre-election violence?
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experienced extreme post-election violence with around 800 fatalities taking 
place after the results were announced (Bekoe, 2012). 
Electoral violence in Nigeria has varied across both time and space. Nigeria 
is a federal republic with 36 states and the Federal Capital Territory, located in 
Abuja. Certain states such as Lagos, Rivers, and Delta State have seen more of the 
brunt of electoral violence. During the 2015 election, violence was concentrated 
in the southwest of the country, with some fatalities also occurring in the Middle 
Belt (Harwood, 2019). During the 2019 elections, much of the violence took place 
in southern Nigeria and the Middle Belt again (Harwood, 2019).
For the purposes of our analysis, we use data on violent events from the 
Armed Conflict Location and Event Dataset (ACLED) to code the dependent var-
iable, pre-election violence events. ACLED collects information on political vio-
lence by type, time, intensity, and location. We identify election-related events 
and the number of associated fatalities, if any, and aggregate them at the state 
level for elections in 2015 and 2019. Since Nigeria typically holds general elec-
tions for all elected offices over a two-week period, we collected information on 
pre-electoral violence associated with the presidential, assembly, senate, state 
house, and gubernatorial races. Similar to other researchers, we confine our anal-
ysis of pre- electoral violence to the six-month period prior to the elections (in-
cluding election day) (Burchard, 2015; Straus & Taylor, 2012). After a six-week 
postponement to allow the government to address insecurity in the North East 
related to the Boko Haram insurgency, elections in 2015 were held on March 28th 
for President and National Assembly and April 11th for governor and the state 
houses. Elections in 2019 were delayed one week due to logistical challenges and 
ultimately held on February 23rd for President and National Assembly and March 
9 for governor and state houses. 
Based on data from ACLED, pre-election violence took place in most Nigerian 
states prior to the 2015 and 2019 general elections at roughly similar rates. Across 
Nigerian states10, only five states (Abia, Ekiti, Kogi, Niger, and Zamfara) did not 
have a recorded instance of pre-election violence prior to the 2015 election and 
only two states (Gombe and Kebbi) did not have a recorded instance prior to the 
2019 election. Ahead of the 2015 elections, there was an average of 4.8 violent 
events per state. Post-election violence was significantly lower in 2015 than in 
2011. After the 2015 elections, there was an average of 0.79 violent events per state 
and an estimated 6 fatalities. Prior to the 2019 elections, there was an average of 
4.6 violent events per state. There were at least 98 fatalities across 20 states in 
10  Due to insecurity in the North East, elections were not held in Adamawa, Borno, or Yobe states. We do not 
include data for these three states in our analysis. 
135Stephanie M. Burchard & Meshack Simati
Cadernos de Estudos Africanos  •  julho-dezembro de 2019  •  38, 123-144
2015 and 91 fatalities across 19 states in 201911. Eighteen states experienced fewer 
violent incidents in 2019 compared to 2015 while 14 states experienced more vi-
olent incidents. In terms of fatalities, 12 states experienced fewer election-related 
fatalities in 2019 compared to 2015 where 12 states experienced more fatalities. 
According to Sani (2015), the Nigerian government established election pe-
tition tribunals in the 1999 Constitution to resolve electoral disputes in a timely 
fashion due to delays experienced through the regular court system in previ-
ous petitions. Through the 2000s, however, EPTs were still not known for their 
speed. For example, it took 34 months to resolve a 2003 gubernatorial dispute. 
Similarly, the success rate of the courts ability to mitigate election petitions has 
been low. Omenma et al. (2017) find that the courts in Nigeria have done little to 
build confidence among voters on the courts ability to overturn elections even in 
the context of overwhelming evidence of fraud. The authors find that between 
1999 and 2011, 160 gubernatorial elections were challenged in court, but the court 
overturned only 10 elections, which translates to a 6.3 percent success rate. 
 As such, the 2006 electoral act also introduced a raft of changes aimed at im-
proving efficiency in adjudication of election petitions by empowering any state 
or federal High Court to address all pre-election disputes. The 2010 Amendment 
to the Constitution requires that all election petitions be submitted within 21 
days after an election has been decided; that EPTs deliver their final written ver-
dict within 180 days; and that all appeals are heard and adjudicated within 60 
days of the initial judgment. 
EPTs vary by level of election and institution. EPTs at the state level hear cas-
es from the National Assembly petitions whose appeal terminates at the Court 
of Appeals. The presidential and gubernatorial EPTs appeals terminate at the 
Supreme Court. Only candidates or parties directly participating in an election 
can file a petition. A petition must be based on at least one of the following four 
criteria: a candidate was not qualified to contest the election; the election was 
marred by corruption or non-compliance with the Electoral Act (as amended in 
2010); the winner did not actually receive a majority of the votes; and/or the pe-
titioner was unlawfully prevented from participating in the election. Temporary 
EPT appointments are managed by the President of the Court of Appeals, National 
Judicial Commission, and Federal Judicial Service Commission. EPTs comprise of 
three to five justices from the High Court, Sharia Court of Appeal, Customary 
Court of Appeal, or other judiciary members at the rank of chief magistrate or 
higher. See Table 1 for an overview of the number of petitions filed per election 
since 2003 (PLACNG, 2017).
11  Data for the 2019 post-election period was not available at the time of writing. 
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Table 1 
Election petitions by year





To code the independent variable (election petitions filed at the state level), 
we collected data from a number of sources including the National Democratic 
Institution, a non-profit organization located in Washington D.C., and the Policy 
and Legal Advocacy Center, a non-governmental organization located in Abuja. 
For the 2011 and 2015 elections, in particular, we were able to track how election 
petitions were ultimately resolved. From this data, we created our independent 
variables on EPT decisions for the 2011 and 2015 elections. Since elite-level choice 
to use the court can be informed by previous court decisions, we create the tribu-
nal election nullification variable by coding the petitions that were successfully 
overturned by the EPTs in 2011 as a 1, representing a nullified election, and 0, 
which represents an upheld election. We do the same for 2015 EPT decisions and 
create a dummy variable where 1 represents at least one successful EPT challenge 
at the state level and 0 represents no EPT successes. Across all elective offices in 
2015, there were a total of around 600 election petition challenges filed in 2015 
(PLACNG, 2017)12. The range was from 2 to 49 election petitions challenges per 
state. There were a total of 333 appeals filed, with a range from 1 to 46 per state. 
Approximately 15 percent (84) of the total challenges at either the tribunal, ap-
peals, or High Court stage were successful in overturning the election result or 
requiring either a partial or complete re-run of the election. Delta State in par-
ticular was forced to re-run several elections for both state and federal offices in 
March 2016 after the 2015 results were annulled due to corruption and violence. 
This marks a substantial increase in the success rates of cases before tribunals. In 
2007, only around 2 percent of all cases were successful in annulling the results 
12  PLACNG only provides disposition data for 560 of the petitions filed in 2015. 
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or forcing new elections (Sani, 2015). This figure increased to 4 percent after the 
2011 elections (Sani, 2015). 
To calculate trust in the courts, we used Afrobarometer survey data. We cre-
ated an index measuring trust in the courts for respondents using rounds 6 and 
7 of the Afrobarometer survey, conducted in 2014 and 2017 before the 2015 and 
2019 elections, respectively. The index ranges from low to high trust, captured 
numerically between 1 and 3, where 1 indicates low trust, 2 some trust, and 3 
high trust13.
We control for the total population of the state at the last census (logged due 
to its right skew) as some have found that localities with higher populations have 
higher incidences of electoral violence (see Daxecker, 2012, 2014) and trust in the 
national elections commission (NEC)14. We also control for the intensity of pre-
election violence by including a variable for number of pre-election fatalities that 
took place in a given state in the six-month period prior to an election15. We be-
lieve that more violent elections could have a negative influence on the decision 
of political actors and dilute the role of trust in encouraging actors to turn to the 
courts16. Our primary independent variable is informed by our theory that courts 
give election political players a less violent avenue through which they can adju-
dicate election-related disputes. We use the independent variable, trust in courts, 
to gauge the likelihood of political players’ choice to take their case to the courts 
as opposed to the streets. Subsequently, high trust in court indicates the politi-
cal players’ belief in the impartiality in the court and vice versa. We include the 
above control variables because previous research suggests they help explain the 
occurrence of electoral violence. We include them in the model in order to rule 
out that these control variables are the ones driving the relationship between our 
dependent and independent variables. Since our analysis only covers three elec-
13  For robustness checks, we took the average percentage of respondents who stated they had “no trust” in the 
courts over a 12-year period at the state level as our alternative measure of trust/lack of trust. We did this for two 
reasons. First, the total number of respondents per survey per state ranges from about 15 to 80, so aggregating 
surveys together over time increased our total number of respondents per state, increasing our ability to general-
ize from the sample. Additionally, because public opinion can be temporarily influenced by short term shocks or 
specific events close to the timing of the survey (i.e., a corruption scandal or the like), we chose to take the average 
of the past several surveys (round 3 fielded in 2005 through round 7 fielded in 2017) as an alternative measure of 
trust and the findings still stay consistent and significant compared with using round 6 and 7 trust indices for 
2015 and 2019 elections, respectively. 
14  The role of competent electoral commissions in reducing the likelihood of election violence taking place has 
been extensively examined by works such as Birch and Muchlinski (2018); Darnolf and Cyllah (2014); Claes and 
von Borzyskowski (2018).
15  While we acknowledge that election violence has many consequences other than death, ranging from physical, psycho-
logical, displacement, destruction, etc., our paper focuses on fatality because it is a consequence that is both measurable and 
readily accessible in available datasets. 
16  There is some evidence to suggest that the intensity of violence and/or conflict has an impact on institutional 
trust (see Bellows & Miguel, 2006).
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tion cycles in the same country, we do not control for electoral system17 because 
there is no variation in electoral rules that would influence electoral violence. 
Discussion and analysis
For the empirical analysis, we use a negative binomial regression to test 
whether the nullification of elections results by EPTs and trust in court have a 
constraining effect on pre-election violence at the state level.18 We test this hy-
pothesis for the 2015 elections in model 1 and model 2 for 2019 elections while 
controlling for logged population, trust in the national election commission, and 
pre-election fatalities (See table 2).
Table 2
Dependent variable: Number of pre-election violence events
Model 1: 2015 Model 2: 2019













Trust in NEC -0.010 
(0.009)













Notes: *p≤0.10, *p≤0.05, ***p≤0.01: Coefficients listed with standard errors in parentheses. Negative 
binomial regression used.
17  Works by Höglund (2009), Fjelde and Höglund (2016) and Dunaiski (2015) argue that electoral rules can influ-
ence the likelihood of pre-election violence taking place.
18  The Nigerian state is our primary unit of analysis. The 33 observations are the number of Nigerian states 
in which elections were held in both 2011 and 2015. General elections were suspended in three states in 2015 
(Adamawa, Borno, & Yobe) due to insecurity caused by Boko Haram.
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For model 1, we find support that overturning an election outcome by an 
election tribunal and high trust in courts reduce the likelihood of pre-election 
violence in the next election. The election overturn by tribunal variable has a 
negative coefficient (-0.504) and is statistically significant with a (0.050) p-value. 
The high trust in court variable is also statistically significant with a negative co-
efficient (-0.775) and p-value (0.07). The control variable for pre-election fatalities 
is also statistically significant with a positive coefficient (0.186) and p-value (0.00) 
indicating that intensity of violence can lead to more violence, possibly retribu-
tive. Both controls for population and trust in the national election commission 
are not statistically significant. Our findings suggest that all else being equal, 
favorable rulings for the challenger by the EPT in the 2011 elections and trust in 
court prior to 2015 were important factors in reducing the possibility of pre-elec-
tion violence during the 2015 elections in Nigeria.
In model 2, we run the same analysis for the 2019 elections, modeling the effect 
of EPT decisions and trust in the courts on pre-election violence at the state level. 
We use successful nullification of an election in 2015 and Afrobarometer’s trust 
in courts from round 7 (conducted in 2017 before the 2019 elections) as our main 
independent variables. We control for population and 2019 pre-election fatalities 
while excluding trust in the national election commission because the variable 
was not available for 2019. We find that having trust in the court significantly 
reduced the likelihood for pre-election violence in the 2019 elections. While con-
trolling for population and pre-election fatalities, we find that having some trust 
in the court was statistically significant with a coefficient of 0.750 and a p-value 
of 0.006. Similarly, having high trust in the court was also statistically signifi-
cant with a coefficient of 0.878 and a p-value of 0.001. However, the successful 
nullification of elections by EPTs in 2015 did not have any significant effect on 
the pre-election violence experienced during the 2019 elections. Consistent with 
2015 elections, pre-election fatalities experienced prior to the 2019 elections also 
influenced the prevalence of pre-election violence. 
Unlike an ordinary least squares model where we can interpret the substan-
tive effects of the independent variable on the dependent variable based on co-
efficients, the coefficients on the negative binomial regression, as a maximum 
likelihood model, help indicate the direction of the effect but less so in interpret-
ing the substantive effect of the EPT decisions and trust in courts on pre-election 
violence. To this end, we use incident rates ratio (IRR) to explain the substantive 
effect of EPT decisions and trust in courts on electoral violence for models 1 and 
2. The results are presented in Table 3.
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Table 3
Incidence rates ratio for pre-election violence for 2015 & 2019 by state
2015 2019
IRR Std. error IRR Std. error
Election overturned 0.604 0.160 - -
Some trust in court - - 0.472 0.129
High trust in court 0.460 0.199 0.415 0.109
Pre-election fatalities 1.204 0.040 1.099 0.022
Notes: We estimate the incidence ratio for pre-election violence for the statistically significant 
variables found in Table 2. Some trust in the courts (2015) and election overturned (in 2019) are 
missing incidence ratio estimates in Table 3 because they were not statistically significant in the 
models reported in Table 2.
Based on the IRR estimated for 2015, every election result that was overturned 
by an EPT in 2011 reduced the incidence of pre-election violence by a factor of 
0.60, holding other variables constant. Comparing low trust and high trust in 
courts, we find that having high trust in courts reduced the incidence of pre-elec-
tion violence by a factor of 0.46 in comparison with the reference category of low 
trust. Pre-election fatalities also increased the incidence of pre-election violence 
by 1.20. In 2019, having some trust and a lot of trust in the courts reduced the in-
cidence of pre-election violence, by 0.47 and 0.42 respectively, while pre-election 
fatalities increased incidences of pre-election violence by factor of 1.09.
These findings, although limited to elections in Nigeria, suggest that the role 
of courts and trust in dispute resolution mechanisms can be instrumental in al-
leviating pre-election violence. We find that if an EPT overturns an election in 
favor of the petitioner, the likelihood of pre-election violence in a subsequent 
election reduces by 60 percent. Similarly, the number of election petitions filed 
in 2015 was significantly related to the disposition of petitions associated with 
the previous 2011 election. The number of petitions filed was significantly higher 
in states where a tribunal overturned previous election results (average: 21.5, 
n=14 states) in 2011, than in states where no elections were overturned in 2011 
(average: 12.9, n=19 states). This suggests that a successful experience with the 
tribunal system might encourage others to turn to tribunals to resolve disputes in 
future elections. Most importantly, trust in courts is a good indicator of whether 
election related disputes will be resolved through the court or through violence. 
We find that on average, incidences of pre-election violence reduce by 45 percent 
if citizens have some trust or a lot of trust in courts.
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Conclusion
Recent efforts targeted at interventions for preventing electoral violence have 
emphasized election monitoring, security planning, attitude transformation and 
capacity building, but the courts as a key domestic component responsible for 
dispute resolution still remains under-researched. This work contributes to the 
ongoing research on electoral violence prevention by evaluating the role election 
petition tribunals and citizens trust in courts play in mitigating electoral violence. 
We find that all else being equal, rulings that nullify election results and trust in 
the judicial system constrain the prevalence of electoral violence. 
Although these findings may or may not be generalizable to sub-Saharan 
Africa and the rest of the democratizing countries around the world due to the 
fact that Nigerian elections are more violent than average, we hope that at the 
very least they should stimulate future research efforts regarding the role of the 
judiciary in mitigating electoral violence. From a policy implication perspective, 
there might be value setting up ad hoc election petition tribunals and building 
capacity in domestic judiciaries to be efficient in adjudicating election-related 
disputes in a shorter time frame. Work could also be undertaken to build trust in 
the courts by citizens. Both factors are important in reducing incentives for elec-
tion-related violence. Due to data constrains, the focus of this research was on the 
pre-election period. Future work can look at whether the same relationship holds 
for the post-election period.
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